“Metaphors We Live By” by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson

Is it true that all of us, not just poets, speak in metaphors, whether we realize it or not? Is it perhaps even true that we live by metaphors? In Metaphors We Live By George Lakoff, a linguist, and Mark Johnson, a philosopher, suggest that metaphors not only make our thoughts more vivid and interesting but that they actually structure our perceptions and understanding. Thinking of marriage as a “contract agreement,” for example, leads to one set of expectations, while thinking of it as “team play,” “a negotiated settlement,” “Russian roulette,” “an indissoluble merger,” or “a religious sacrament” will carry different sets of expectations. When a government thinks of its enemies as “turkeys or “clowns” it does not take them as serious threats, but if the are “pawns” in the hands of the communists, they are taken seriously indeed. Metaphors We Live By has led many readers to a new recognition of how profoundly metaphors not only shape our view of life in the present but set up the expectations that determine what life well be for us in the future. (from introduction in The Conscious Reader)

“Metaphors We Live By” by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson

Our selection comprises chapters 1, 2, 3, and part of 4 of Metaphors We Live By (1980).


Metaphor is for most people device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish–a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found,on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.

The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we thinks what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.

But our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of. in most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and act more or less automatically along certain lines. Just what these lines are is by no means obvious. One way to find out is by looking at language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like.

Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. And we have found a way to begin to identify in detail just what the metaphors are halt structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.

To give some idea of what it could mean for a concept to be metaphorical and for such a concept to structure an everyday activity, let us start with the concept ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:


Your claims are indefensible.

He attacked every weak point in my argument.

His criticisms were right on target.

I demolished his argument.

I’ve never won an argument with him.

you disagree? Okay, shoot!

If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.

He shot down all of my arguments.

It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of

It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument–attack, defense, counter-attack, etc.—reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; its structures the actions we perform in arguing. Try to imagine a culture where arguments are not viewed in terms of war, where no one wins or loses, where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground. Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently. But we would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing something different. It would seem strange even to call what they were doing “arguing.” In perhaps the most neutral way of describing this difference between their culture and ours would be to say that we have a discourse form structured in terms of battle and they have one structured in terms of dance. This is an example of what it means for a metaphorical concept, namely, ARGUMENT IS WAR, to structure (at least in part) what we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.. It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things–verbal discourse and armed conflict–and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured.

Moreover, this is the ordinary way of having an argument and talking about one. The normal way for us to talk about attacking a position is to use the words “attack a position.” Our conventional ways of talking about arguments presuppose a metaphor we are hardly ever conscious of. The metaphors not merely in the words we use–it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way–and we act according to the way we conceive of things.

The most important claim we have made so far is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined. Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person’s conceptual system. Therefore, whenever in this book we speak of metaphors, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, it should be understood that metaphor means metaphorical concept.


Arguments usually follow patterns; that is, there are certain things we typically do and do not do in arguing. The fact that we in part conceptualize arguments in terms of battle systematically influences the shape argument stake and the way we talk about what we do in arguing. Because the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic.

We saw in the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor that expressions from the vocabulary of war, e.g., attack a position, indefensible, strategy, new line of attack, win, gain ground, etc., form a systematic way of talking about the battling aspects of arguing. It is no accident that these expressions mean what they mean when we use them to talk about arguments. A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes file concept of an argument, and the language follows suit. Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.

To get an idea of how metaphorical expressions in everyday language icon give us insight into the metaphorical nature of the concepts that structure our everyday activities, let us consider the metaphorical concept TIME IS Money as it is reflected in contemporary English.


You’re wasting my time.

This gadget will save you hours. I don’t have the time to give you.

How do you spend your time these days? That flat tire cost me an hour.

I’ve invested a lot of time in her.

1 don’t have enough time to spare for that.You’re running out of time.

You need to budget your time.

Put aside aside some time for ping pong.

Is that worth your while?

Do you have much time left?

He’s living on I borrowed time.

You don’t use your time, profitably.

I lost a lot of time when I got sick.

Thank you for your time.

Time in our culture is a valuable commodity. It is a limited resource that we use to accomplish our goals. Because of the way that the concept of work has developed in modern Western culture, where work is typically associated with the time it takes and time is precisely quantified, it has become customary to pay people by the hour, week, or year. In our culture TIME IS MONEY in many ways: telephone message units, hourly wages, hotel room rates, yearly budgets, interest on loans, and paying your debt to society by “serving time.” These practices are relatively new in the history of the human race, and by no means do they exist in all cultures. They have arisen in modern industrialized societies and structure our basic everyday activities in a very profound way. Corresponding to the fact that we act as if time is a valuable commodity–a limited resource, even money–we conceive of time that way. Thus we understand and experience time as the kind of thing that can be spent, wasted, budgeted, invested wisely or poorly, saved, or squandered.

TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, and TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY are all metaphorical concepts. They are metaphorical since we are using our everyday experiences with money, limited resources, and valuable commodities to conceptualize time. This isn’t a necessary way for human beings to conceptualize time; it is tied to our culture. There are cultures where time is none of these things.

The metaphorical concepts TIME IS MONEY, TIME 1S A RESOURCE, and TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY form a single system based on sub-categorization, since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable commodities. These sub categorization relationships characterize entailment relationships between the metaphors: TIME IS MONEY entails that TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, which entails that TIME 1S A VALUABLE COMMODITY.

We are adopting the practice of using the most specific metaphorical concept, in this case TIME IS MONEY to characterize the entire system. Of the expressions listed under the TIME IS MONEY metaphor, some refer specifically to money (spend, invest, budget, probably cost), others to limited resources (use, use up, have enough of, run out of), and still others to valuable commodities (have, give, lose, thank you for). This is an example of the way in which metaphorical entailments can characterize a coherent system of metaphorical concepts and a corresponding coherent system of metaphorical expressions for those concepts.

The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms terms of another (e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle) will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept (e.g., the battling aspects of arguing), metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor. For example, in the midst of a heated argument, when we are intent on attacking our opponent’s position and defending our own, we may lose sight of the cooperative aspects of arguing. Someone who is arguing with you can be viewed as giving you his time, a valuable commodity, in an effort at mutual understanding. But when we are preoccupied with the battle aspects, we often lose sight of the cooperative aspects.

A far more subtle case of how a metaphorical concept can hide an aspect of our experience can be seen in what Michael Reddy has called the “conduit metaphor.”‘ Reddy observes that our language about language is structured roughly by the following complex metaphor:




The speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a bearer who takes the idea/objects out of the word/containers. Reddy documents this with more than a hundred types of expressions in English, which he estimates account for at least 70 percent of the expressions we use for talking about language. Here are some examples:


It’s hard to get that idea across to him.

I gave you that idea.

Your reasons came through to us.

It’s difficult to put my ideas into words.

When you have a good idea, try to capture it immediately in words.

Try to pack more thought into fewer words.

You can’t simply stuff ideas into a sentence any old way.

The meaning is right there in the words.

Don’t force your meanings into the wrong words.

His words carry little meaning.

The introduction has a great deal of thought content.

Your words seem hollow.

The sentence is without meaning.

The idea is buried in terribly dense paragraphs.

In examples like these it is far more difficult to see that there is anything hidden by the metaphor or even to see that there is a metaphor here at all. This is so much the conventional way of thinking about language that it is sometimes hard to imagine that it might not fit reality. But if we look at what the conduit metaphor entails, we can see some of the ways in which it masks aspects of the communicative process.

First, the Linguistic EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANINGS aspect of the conduit metaphor entails that words and sentences have meanings in themselves, independent of any context or speaker. The MEANINGS ARE OBJECTS part of the metaphor, for example, entails that meanings have an existence independent of people and contexts. The part of the metaphor that says LINGUISTICS EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANING entails that words (and sentences) have meanings, again independent of contexts and speakers. These metaphors are appropriate in many situations–those where context differences don’t matter and where all the participants in the conversation understand the sentences in the same way. These two entailments are exemplified by sentences like

The meaning is right there in the words,

which, according to the CONDUIT metaphor, can correctly be said of any sentence. But there are many cases where context does matter. Here is a celebrated one recorded in actual conversation by Pamela Downing:

Please sit in the apple-juice seat.

In isolation this sentence has no meaning at all, since the expression “apple-juice seat” is not a conventional way of referring to any kind of object. But the sentence makes perfect sense in the context in which it was uttered. An overnight guest came down to breakfast. There were four place settings, three with orange juice and one with apple juice. It was clear what the apple-juice seat was. And even the next morning, when there was no apple juice, it was still clear which seat was the apple-juice seat.

In addition to sentences that have no meaning without context, there are cases where a single sentence will mean different things to different people. Consider:

We need new alternative sources of energy.

This means something very different to the president of Mobil Oil from what it means to the president of Friends of the Earth. The meaning is not right there in the sentence–it matters a lot who is saying or listening to the sentence and what his social and political attitudes are. The CONDUIT metaphor does not fit cases where context is required to determine whether the sentence has any meaning at all and, if so, what meaning it has.

These examples show that the metaphorical concepts we have looked at provide us with a partial understanding of what communication, argument, and time are and that, in doing this, they hide other aspects of these concepts. It is important to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not total. If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely be understood in terms of it. For example, time isn’t really money. If you spend your time trying to do something and it doesn’t work, you can’t get your time back. There are no time banks. I can give you a lot of time, but you can’t give me back the same time, though you can give me back the same amount of time. And so on. Thus, part of a metaphorical concept does not and cannot fit.

On the other hand, metaphorical concepts can be extended beyond the range of ordinary literal ways of thinking and talking into the range of what is called figurative, poetic, colorful, or fanciful thought and language. Thus, if ideas are objects, we can dress them?n up in fancy clothes, juggle them, line them up nice and neat, etc. So when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphors we mean that it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others.


So far we have examined what we will call structural metaphors, cases where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another. But there is another kind of metaphorical concept, one that does not structure one concept in terms of another but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. We will call these orientational metaphors, since most of them have to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial orientation; for example, happy is up. The fact that the concept HAPPY is oriented up leads to English expressions like “I’m feeling up today.”

Such metaphorical orientations are not arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience. Though the polar oppositions up-down,in-out, etc., are physical in nature, the orientational metaphors based on them vary from culture to culture. For example, in some cultures the future is in front of us, whereas in others it is in back. We will be looking at up-down spatialization metaphors, which have been studied intensively by William Nagy, as an illustration. In each case, we will give a brief hint about how such metaphorical concept might have arisen from our physical and cultural experience. These accounts are mean, to be suggestive and plausible, not definitive.


I’m feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. you’re in high spirits. Thinking about her always gives me a lift. I’m feeling down. I’m depressed. He’s really low these days. I fell into a depression. My spirits sank.

physical basis: Drooping Posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state.


Wake up Wake up. I’m up already. He rises early in the morning. He fell asleep. He dropped off to sleep. He’s under hypnosis. He’s under hypnosis. He sank into a coma.

Physical basis: Humans and most other mammals sleep lying down and stand up when they awaken.



He’s at the peak of health. Lazarus rose from the dead. He’s in top shape.As to his health, he’s way up there. He fell ill. He’s sinking fast. He came down with the flu. His health is declining. He dropped dead.

Physical basis: Serious illness forces us to lie down physically. When you’re dead, you are physically down.



I have control over her. I am on top of the situation. He’s in a superior position. He’s at the height of his power. He’s in the high command. He’s in the upper echelon. His power rose. He ranks above me in strength. He is under my control. He fell from power. His Power is on the decline. He is my social interior. He is low man on the totem pole.

Physical basis- Physical size typically correlates with physical strength, and the victor in a fight is typically on top.


The number of books printed each year keeps going up. His draft number is high. My income rose last year. The amount of artistic activity in this state has gone down in the past year. The number of errors he made is incredibly low. His income fell last year. He is underage. If you’re 100 hot, turn the heat down.

Physical basis: If you add more of a substance or of physical objects to a container or pile, the level goes up.


All upcoming events are listed in the paper. What’s coming up this week? I’m afraid of what’s up ahead of us. What’s up?

Physical basis: Normally our eyes look in the direction in which we typically move (ahead, forward). As an object approaches a person (or the person approaches the object), the object appears larger. Since the ground is perceived as being fixed, the top of the object appears to be moving upward in the person’s field of vision.


He has a lofty position. She’ll rise to the top. He’s at the peak of his career.He’s climbing the ladder. He has little upward mobility. He’s at the bottom of the social hierarchy. She fell in status.

Social and physical basis: Status is correlated with (social) power and (physical) power is up.


Things are looking up. We hit a peak last year, but it’s been downhill ever since. Things are at an all-time low. He does high-quality work.

Physical basis for personal well-being: Happiness, health, life, and control–the things that principally characterize what is good for a person–all are up.


He is high-minded. She has high standards. She is up right. She is an up-standing citizen. That was a low trick. Don’t be underhanded. I wouldn’t stoop to that. That would be beneath me. He fell into the abyss of depravity. That was a low-down thing to do.

Physical and social basis: GOOD IS UP for a person (physical basis), together with SOCIETY IS A PERSON (in the version where you are not identifying with your society). To be virtuous is to act in accordance with the standards set by the society/person to maintain its well-being. VIRTUE IS UP because virtuous actions correlate with social well-being from the society/person’s point of view. Since socially based metaphors are part of the culture, it’s the society/person’s point of view that counts.


The discussion fell to the emotional level, but I raised it back up to the rational plane. We put our feelings aside and had a high-level intellectual discussion of the matter. He couldn’t rise above his emotions.

Physical and cultural basis: In our culture people view themselves as being in control over animals, plants, and their physical environment, and it is their unique ability to reason that places human beings above other animals and gives them this control. CONTROL IS UP thus provides a basis for MAN IS UP and therefore RATIONAL IS UP.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By.
-Possibilities for dialogue depends on the “conceptual systems” of the people engaged in the dialogue
-Conceptual systems may vary without awareness – from person to person… also across cultures
-Two related spheres of variation: Conceptual Metaphors and Folk Theory

1. Introductory remarks:
Central to the different perspective I want to formulate, is this claim by Rorty (1980, p.12), that:

“It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions.”
Behind this approach to language is a new image-schematism in terms of which to think about language itself:
-Not representational: i) rather than in terms of words-standing-for-things, of words working in a one-to-one code to ‘picture’ or represent things
-But formative or constitutive: ii) the main function of language is thought of it as being formative, as the activity of giving ‘instructions’ to others about how to give form to an otherwise formless state of affairs – see the ‘conduit metaphor’ and its ‘instructive’ alternative below.
2. Metaphor and the further specification of form:
How does metaphor play its part in this form-giving process?

Lakoff and Johnson have a particular approach to this problem which I want to commend to you: They begin by making a radical claim:

1) “Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary language rather than ordinary language…
2) We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system [I would say, our ‘common sense knowledge’], in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (p.3).

For: Metaphors function to give:

-a partially structured circumstance a more well (but, as we shall see, a still not completely) specified structure
-to understand a new and unfamiliar circumstance in terms of an old and familiar one
-to understand the less concrete in terms of the more concrete
-the nonphysical in terms of the physical
“The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (my emphasis, p.5)… we ‘carry over’ a way of responding in one sphere of our lives into another.

“Metaphor is one of our most important tools for trying to comprehend partially what cannot be comprehended totally: our feelings, aesthetic experiences, moral practices, and spiritual awareness… Truth is relative to understanding, which means that there is no absolute objective truths about the world. This does not mean that there are no truths; it means that truth is relative to our conceptual system [way of talking], which is grounded in, and constantly tested by, our experiences and those of other members of our culture in our daily interactions with other people and with our physical and cultural environments” (p.193).

3. Initial example:

To give some idea of what it could mean for one not only to understand, but to experience an otherwise only partially structured situation in terms of a metaphor, let us start with the concept of ARGUMENT, and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR:


He attacked every weak point in my argument.
Your claims are indefensible.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
He shot down all my arguments.

We do not just talk or think about arguing in terms of war; the fact is, many of the things we do – attacking positions, defending positions, using strategies, etc – can be (partially) structured by the concept of war.

4. Forms of metaphor:

Lakoff and Johnson think of less well specified “domains of experience” as being structured in terms of image schematisms derived from basic domains of experience.

“Image schematisms”: 1) have ‘conditions of satisfaction’; 2) small number of elements and relations.

They suggest metaphorical resources can be drawn from a number of basic domains:

i) spatial orientations (e.g., UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, NEAR-FAR, FRONT-BACK);
ii) ontological concepts (things, stuff – nouns) (e.g., ENTITY, SUBSTANCE, CONTAINER, PERSON); and
iii) structured experience (activities – verbs) (e.g., EATING, MOVING, PUSHING/PULLING OBJECTS, CONVERSATION, etc.)

i. orientational metaphors: MORE IS UP (The price goes up each year); GOOD IS UP (Things are looking up) – in which a whole system of concepts is organized spatially.

ii. ontological (thing) metaphors: THE MIND IS A CONTAINER (He got nothing in his head); THE MIND IS A MACHINE (My mind just isn’t working today) – in which unbounded and unstructured aspects of our experience are structured as if they were entities or substances.

iii. structural (activity) metaphors: TIME IS MONEY (Save time; don’t waste time); UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (I see what you’re saying; let me point out something to you) – in which one structured concept is restructured by another.

5. Metaphors have entailments:

i) Container metaphor (in-out orientation):
– protection from external forces;
– limiting of forces within the container;
– fixity of location ‘in’ the container;
– transitivity of containment, i.e., if a is in be, and b is in c, then a is in c.

ii) We do not find money growing on trees; it is a limited resource. This entails that it is a valuable commodity. These entailments will be transferred to time in the TIME IS MONEY metaphor.

TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE (I like to help, but I don’t have the time to give you).
TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY (My time is precious right now).

6. Metaphorical definitions: partial, inconsistent, overlapping:


However, no single, concrete, basic domain concept is ever structured in exactly the right way to completely and precisely define any single abstract concept. Thus we understand abstract concepts in terms of many – partial, inconsistent, overlapping – metaphorical definitions, each of which captures only a part of the concept. For example, the concept IDEA is defined by a rich and complex cluster of metaphors:

IDEAS ARE ORGANISMS (people: Cognitive psychology is still in its infancy); (plants: His ideas have finally come to fruition).
IDEAS ARE PRODUCTS (He produces an idea every second)
IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES (He won’t buy that idea)
IDEAS ARE RESOURCES ( He ran out of ideas; let’s pool our ideas)
IDEAS ARE MONEY (He has a wealth of ideas)
IDEAS ARE CUTTING INSTRUMENTS (That cuts to the heart of the matter)
IDEAS ARE FOOD (I just can’t swallow that idea)
IDEAS ARE FASHION (That idea went out of fashion years ago)

Each of these metaphors defines some aspect of what an idea is, but taken together they do not provide a consistent definition for the concept of IDEA. Each metaphor highlights certain aspects of a concept but hides others: The IDEAS ARE PEOPLE metaphor emphasizes DEVELOPMENT, COMING INTO and GOING OUT OF EXISTENCE; but hides the fact that IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES, and have commercial value.

7. The ‘grounding’ of metaphors in experience:

Metaphorical concepts of all types arise from physical and cultural experience, but some seem more basic than others.

Lakoff and Johnson claim that a “basic domain of experience” is:

“a structured whole within our experience which is conceptualized as an experiential gestalt” (p.117).

Where, an experiential gestalt is a “multidimensional structured whole” (p.81).

i): Conversation: For instance, such a gestalt is, they say, CONVERSATION. And in using the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, the gestalt for CONVERSATION is specified/structured further by means of the correspondences with selected elements of the gestalt for WAR. (But only partially, as was made clear above, for in fact this metaphor hides other, more cooperative aspects of arguments.)


If you let me finish my sentence, then you can have your turn.
Let’s define our terms.
He understood my position.
He replied to my point thus…
She totally misunderstood what I was saying.
If you will let me just explain…
So we agree then!?

Structure of conversation gestalt (as argumentation):

Participants (speaker/hearer :: adversaries); turn-taking (two positions; criticism/justification; attack/defense; claim/counter claim; strategies; maneuvers; victory/silence); stages (initial conditions; beginning; middle; end); linear sequence (retreat after attack; counter attack; defense after attack); causation (attack results in defense, etc); purpose (to win).

ii): Simple spatial concepts, such as ‘up’: The prime candidates for concepts that are “understood directly” (they say, p.56) are simple spatial concepts, such as UP. The structure of our spatial concepts, they say, “emerges from our constant spatial experience, that is, our interaction with our physical environment” (pp.56-7).

However (problems with this claim):

“…what we call ‘direct physical experience’ is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then ‘interpret’ in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. it would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our ‘world’ in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself” P.57).

Thus, what is claimed about ‘grounding’ is not that it is in any physical absolutes, only that we typically talk about the nonphysical in terms of the physical, the less clearly specified in terms of the more clearly specified – were what is basic for us lies in who we are, i.e., our social ontology – our development as competent participants in developmental, communicative practices.

8. The ‘conduit metaphor’ (what it cannot do!) and its ‘instructive’ alternative:

8.1 The conduit metaphor:

No theory of communication or understanding can be adequate if it can not account for the crucial role of conceptual metaphors and folk theories in people’s understanding and use of language. However, such theories are often themselves based upon certain folk theories – models of some aspect of reality which, for the most part, is taken as constituting common sense, i.e., what everyone knows and takes for granted – which include certain conceptual metaphors.

The conduit metaphor (Reddy, 1979) is made up of the following parts:


According to the conduit metaphor, a speaker takes ideas out of his mind, puts them into words (an ‘insertion’ process), and sends them (as if along a conduit) to a hearer, who takes out the meaning objects from the words.

As Reddy shows, this metaphor accounts for approx. 70% of our talk about language.

Wittgenstein (1953, no.115):

“A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”

The CONDUIT metaphor:

It’s hard to put my ideas into words.
Let me try to get across what I have in mind.
You still have not given me any idea of what you mean.

The CONDUIT metaphor seems ‘natural’ because it fits certain types of situations very well; thus many linguists and philosophers take it as prototypical. These are the types of situation in which it holds:

i) – Speakers equally competent;
ii) – Relevant to the subject matter and the context, the participants share:

1. the same cultural assumptions
2. the same relevant knowledge of the world
3. the same relevant background knowledge about the context of the utterance;
4. the same understanding of what the conversation is about;
5. and the same relevant metaphors and folk theories.

These are situations of information exchange, not of the development of an understanding – although there is nothing pernicious in the metaphor itself, our culture offers no other conventional alternative. Thus it is difficult for us to understand communication across conceptual systems, i.e., communication in which moves from a mistake-full, improvised form of communication to a smooth, skilful form, e.g., forms of communication in which a language is learnt.

8.2 An alternative: the ‘toolmakers’ metaphor and ‘instruction’:

The ‘toolmakers paradigm’:

– Assumption of ‘radical subjectivity’, i.e., people completely separated from one another except…
– they can exchange crude sets of ‘instructions’ with one another.
– here something is being ‘made known’ to someone.

Comparison of i) ‘conduit metaphor’ with ii) ‘toolmakers system’:

Success: i) not success without effort, but ii) communication will always go wrong unless effort is expended.
What is explained: i) not failure to communicate, but ii) success, i.e., partial communication will be normal; partial misunderstanding, or divergence in readings of single text are not aberrations, but are to be expected.
3. Order: i) not ‘naturally’ ordered, as the ‘conduit metaphor’ would have it, but ii) only gathered together if the people involved make the effort to do it.
Successful human communication always involves an increase in organization, which can only happen under special, unusual conditions.

Reddy: “To me, from my vantage point now, it seems that the toolmakers paradigm and radical subjectivism form a coherent, common-sense view of what happens when we talk – a common-sense view which finds support in everything from this second law of thermodynamics to recent work in artificial intelligence or cognitive psychology… [But] I confess that it took me nearly five years to come around to radical subjectivism as ‘common-sense’. What stood in the way was never a counter-argument, but rather the simply inability to think clearly about the matter. My mind would seem to go to sleep at crucial moments, and it was only the mounting weight of more and more evidence that finally forced it to stay awake… [arguments about the value of the ‘toolmakers paradigm’] will fall on deaf ears until the biasing effect of the conduit metaphor has been dealt with” (pp.296-7).

9. Semantic pathology:

9.1 Its pervasiveness: I. difficulty of devising alternatives.

Not easy to discard the conduit metaphor (cm); it is ‘inscribed’ in (sic) every aspect of our language use, and thus in all our communicative practices.

It is not impossible to think (momentarily, and self-consciously) in terms of the ‘toolmakers paradigm’ (tmp), but such thinking remains brief, isolated, and fragmentary, in the face of an opposing system of usages.

Counting up expressions: conduit metaphor expressions = 140; others = 30/40. Other expressions long, and ‘latinate’ (in English).

– Communicate your feelings using words (tmp avoids cm).
– Communicate your feeling in words (uses cm).
– Did you get anything out of (cm) the articles in the reader?
– Were you able to construct (tmp) anything of interest on the basis of the assigned texts?

9.2 Its pervasiveness: II. depth.

Consider two uses of the word poem:

1. ‘Poem/one’: on the page:
– The poem was almost illegible.
– The poem has five lines and forty words.
– The poem is without rhymes.

2. ‘Poem/two’: in the head:
– That poem was depressing.
– That poem was too obscene for children.
– Donne’s poem is very logical.

If words in language contain (cm) ideas, then ‘poem/one’ contains ‘poem/two’, i.e., the more concrete term containing the more abstract one (metonymy – whole/part relation).

As long as we are happy with cm, then this ambiguity is in no way problematic.

In the tmp, ‘poem/one’ does not automatically contain ‘poem/two’. Different people will assemble mental and emotional materials in different ways to construct within themselves many different ‘poem/two’s’. Only if they expend a great deal of time checking and testing, and comparing notes, can they come to an agreed common meaning. They is no automatic extension of ‘poem/one’ tp ‘poem/two’.

For tmp followers, the ambiguity between ‘poem/one’ and ‘poem/two’ is a real and severe linguistic pathology – a linguistic pathology is “whenever two or more incompatible senses capable of figuring meaningfully in the same context develop around the same textual term.”

– The novel is 112 pages long (no problem).
– The novel is deeply symbolic (problem – which novel?).

9.3 Special case: information theory itself.

Information: the ability to make nonrandom selections from a set of alternatives.
Communication: the transfer of this ability from one place to another.
A set of alternatives – the repertoire – and a code: possessed by both sender and receiver: the ‘a priori shared context’.
Messages (coded signals) = ‘instructions’ about making selections.

In this model: messages are not ‘contained’ in the signals: information is the power to make selections.

Ambiguity of term ‘message’:

– I got your message (on paper) OK, but I’ve had no time yet to read it.
– OK, I get the message (in my head); let’s leave him alone.

In information theory, signals do something; they do not contain anything: Yet even now we find commentators on the theory saying: “The theory [of information] was concerned with the problem of defining the quantity of information contained in a massage to be transmitted…” (Sereno and Mortensen, 1970, p.62).

Social Relations as Problem as Solution as
Machine Breakdown Repair
Organism Pathology Cure
Game Strategy New Moves
Drama Script, Plot New Actors, Re-author
Ritual Rite de Passage Separation-in Limbo-Re-entry
Text Performance Re-author

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s